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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1993).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment on the
issue of informed consent to surgery where:
1.

Mr. Morgan failed to show by expert testimony
that the surgery Dr. Gibbons' performed
carried a "substantial and significant" risk
of "serious harm" — a showing that is
necessary to establish that Dr. Gibbons had a
duty to disclose the risk of such harm;

2.

Reasonable minds could not differ that any
reasonable and prudent person in Mr. Morgan's
condition would choose to undergo surgery to
cure a serious and even potentially lifethreatening condition after being informed of
its risks and the risks of non-treatment; and

3.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff executed a
written consent to the surgery performed.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

The standard of review for this issue, is stated in Hill
Seattle

First

Nat'l

Bank,

827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992):

We affirm a trial court's grant of a motion for summary
judgment on any reasonable legal basis even if not
relied upon below. See, Zions First
Nat'l
Bank v.
National
Am. Title
Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah
1988); cf. Cambelt Int'l
Corp. v. Dalton,
745 P.2d

1239, 1241-42 (Utah 1987). However, any rationale for
affirming a decision must find support in the record.

- 1 -

v.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5 (1987) (attached as Appendix)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is a medical malpractice action in which
Plaintiff/Appellant Daniel P. Morgan ("Mr. Morgan") seeks damages
for having developed a post-operative abscess following sinus
surgery in March 1990. Mr. Morgan has stipulated that
Defendant/Appellee Gary Gibbons, M.D., ("Dr. Gibbons") complied
with the standard of care of a specialist in otolaryngology in
the performance of the surgery and in providing post-operative
care.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 3.)

Mr. Morgan's only remaining

allegation is that Dr. Gibbons failed to obtain Mr. Morgan's
informed consent to the surgery.
B.

Id.

Course of Proceedings

Mr. Morgan commenced this action on October 18, 1991.
(R. 1.)

On December 24, 1992, Dr. Gibbons moved for summary

judgment on the grounds that Mr. Morgan's allegations were
unsupported by expert testimony.
C.

(R. 61.)

Disposition in the Court Below

Judge Gordon J. Low entered a memorandum decision on
March 24, 1991, and an order granting Dr. Gibbons' Motion for
Summary Judgment on April 6, 1993.

(R. 165, 168.)

filed a notice of appeal on May 6, 1993.

- 2 -

(R. 169.)

Mr. Morgan

D.

Statement of Relevant Facts

In October 1989, Mr. Morgan developed a sharp pain below his
right eye which appeared in combination with fever and nasal
congestion.

When the problem persisted despite treatment at an

InstaCare facility, Mr. Morgan went to Dr. Gibbons, a board
certified specialist in otolaryngology.

(Deposition of Daniel

Morgan [hereinafter "Morgan"], R. 74 - 76; Deposition of Gary
Gibbons, M.D. [hereinafter "Dr. Gibbons"], R. 89 - 90.)
Dr. Gibbons prescribed antibiotics and decongestants which
relieved Mr. Morgan's symptoms for a time.

His symptoms,

however, reoccurred in December and again in January 1990.
(Morgan, R. 77 - 80.)
On January 22, 1990, Dr. Gibbons performed a physical
examination and a CT scan, discovering polyps in Mr. Morgan's
sinuses.

The polyps appeared to be inverted papilloma, tumors

which behave like a malignancy in that they invade surrounding
structures, endangering the sinus bones, the eye and the brain.
(Dr. Gibbons, R. 91 - 92.)

The only safe alternative for

treatment of Mr. Morgan's condition was surgical removal of the
diseased tissue.

(Dr. Gibbons, R. 93.)

Dr. Gibbons explained to

Mr. Morgan the dangers inherent in an inverted papilloma.
Mr. Morgan, who described himself as a "reasonably compliant
person," accepted Dr. Gibbons' recommendation and agreed to the
surgery.

(Morgan, R.

81 - 83.)

Surgery was scheduled for

February 28, 1990.

- 3 -

On February 27, 1990, the day prior to surgery, Dr. Gibbons
performed another history and physical examination of Mr. Morgan.
Dr. Gibbons described the technique of surgery to be used.
Mr. Morgan concedes that, during that exam, Dr. Gibbons explained
to him that "there is always the risk of infection" associated
with the surgery, and that Dr. Gibbons answered all of his
questions.

(Morgan, R. 84 - 85.)

After Dr. Gibbons'

explanation, Mr. Morgan signed a Written Consent to Operation,
Anesthesia and Other Medical Services.

(R. 97; Morgan, R. 86.)

Following the operation, Mr. Morgan developed an infection
in the form of a subperiosteal abscess which required surgery to
drain.

(Dr. Gibbons, R. 94 - 95.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Summary judgment was appropriately rendered below because
Mr. Morgan failed to produce expert testimony establishing that
the surgery Dr. Gibbons performed carries a "substantial and
significant risk" of causing "serious harm."

Absent such

testimony, Mr. Morgan cannot show that Dr. Gibbons had a duty to
disclose the risk of developing the complications from which
Mr. Morgan suffered.

Moreover, this action is barred by the Utah

Health Care Malpractice Act ("the Act") because it cannot be
disputed that a reasonable person in Mr. Morgan's condition prior
to surgery would opt for that treatment after being fully
informed of the risks of treatment and non-treatment.

Finally,

the Act bars Mr. Morgan's action because the written consent

- 4 -

Mr. Morgan executed prior to surgery constitutes a complete
defense to a claim of lack of informed consent.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE
MR. MORGAN FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY EXPERT TESTIMONY
THAT THE SURGERY PERFORMED CARRIES A "SUBSTANTIAL
AND SIGNIFICANT RISK" OF "SERIOUS HARM."
Mr. Morgan argues that summary judgment should be reversed
because a factual dispute exists concerning what risks
Dr. Gibbons disclosed to Mr. Morgan prior to surgery.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8.)

According to Mr. Morgan, "the

critical factual issue which is hotly disputed by the parties is
what disclosures of risks of the surgical procedure proposed by
Dr. Gibbons were disclosed to Mr. Morgan, Ph.D."

Id.

The

factual question of what risks were disclosed, however, was not
relevant to summary judgment.

That question would have become

important only if Mr. Morgan had established what risks
Dr. Gibbons had a duty to disclose.

The issue before the trial

court on summary judgment, therefore, was whether Mr. Morgan had
any legal basis for his claim that Dr. Gibbons' breached his duty
to disclose risks.
A physician's duty to disclose risks is governed by the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act ("the Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1
to -15 (1987 & Supp. 1989).

Under the Act, a plaintiff can

overcome the presumption of informed consent if he or she proves,
inter

alia,

that "the health care rendered carried with it a

substantial and significant risk of causing the patient serious
- 5 -
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complications are generally outside the knowledge of lay persons.
It is well settled under Utah law that matters outside the
knowledge and experience of lay persons must be established by
expert testimony.

King v. Searle

(Utah 1992); Butterfield
Chadwick,

supra;

Pharmaceuticals,

v. Okubo, 831 P.2d (Utah 1992);

Hoopiiaiana

v. Intermountain

P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987); Kim v. Anderson,
(Utah 1980).

832 P.2d 858

Health

Care,

740

610 P.2d 1270, 1271

The rationale for requiring expert testimony

concerning such matters is identical to the reason behind
requiring physician disclosure in the first place.

The

Washington Supreme Court explained:
The central reason for requiring physicians to disclose
risks to their patients is that patients are unable to
recognize the risks by themselves. Just as patients
require disclosure of risks by their physicians to give
an informed consent, a trier of fact requires
description of risks by an expert to make an informed
decision.
Smith v. Shannon,

666 P.2d 351, 356 (Wash. 1983).

Moreover, lay factfinders need more than just a description
of the risks; they also need information on the likelihood of
occurrence.

Clearly, whether a risk is "substantial and

significant" is a function not only of severity, but also of
frequency.

A complication that occurs so infrequently as to pose

only a remote risk of harm cannot reasonably be found to be
"substantial and significant."

See,

e.g.,

Stottlemire

v.

Cawood,

213 F. Supp 897 (D.D.C 1968) (1 in 800,000 chance of aplastic
anemia does not require disclosure); Yates

v. Harms, 393 P.2d 982

(Kan. 1964) (1.5 percent chance of losing eye does not require
- 7 -

star

disclosure);
250 to : ".: *
requ-i-

±n

-hanc-

esophagus does

* -:

& Washington Supreme

disclosure

recoym^v

apable of judging *• *
OOO

deterxninina *

.sks exist an*, • rie
^

XT • < £ U

r 1

ne t e s t i m o n y or an e* * - t

A iJear majority ol states consider JI.^

M

s|lM

i •

,

1

concluded that expert testimony is tequired to sustain an
11 1 i l l 1 I 1 mi 111

I I in

d e t e r m i n e t h e m a t e r i a l ! 1t' a n u
e d many c o u r t s

to

ifich

11 'IP •

ni mi 1 Il ni mi I mi I s o l iiiii.i i I I C M I

l a yp e r s o n s

( r e q i " i i lj 1,1 s p e e i i n ,

muuiuiu

that

result,,,

I ill III! I

Il

i[||Mi

M

r. 1 u k b

I n>ng s u c h

' iri ( Io««3 1 991 )

ill

which the plaintitl, ( ",i , claimed damages resulting I torn '>er
ophthalmologist's failure to disclose the risk of retinal
detachment

iiiiiii mli'iii

N.W.2d. at 2b,

in

in

I

nil i\x n » 1 fim P ii

Cox

Cox did not: introduce* o*|>oil 1 estimuny

materiality of thai risl<
j u d g m e i 1 t:

111 11 11 ill

1

I II

MI', at 26,

4/0

" the

In upholding summary

1 \\ »lhil lli.i 1 mi i I 1 n | 1 ill , I I I 1

inpi p m e

Court

Iowa h e l d :

Knowledge n un^ m.
., likelihood of occurrence, u1
materiality of retir 1; detachment certainly are not
factors within the common knowledge of laypersons and
reguire the introduction of expert evidence.
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Id.

Several other states have reached the same result for the

same reason.

See, e.g.,

Bloskas

v. Murray,

646 P.2d 907, 913

(Colo. 1982) ("the substantiality of a particular risk must be
determined on the basis of expert medical testimony"); Ritz
Florida

Patient's

Compensation

Fund,

v.

436 So.2d 987, 991 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("What are the accepted risks, what are
foreseeable risks, what are remote and speculative risks require,
in our opinion, expert testimony as a basis for determining the
extent of disclosures necessary to constitute consent as
* informed.'"); Calabrese

v.

Trenton

State

606 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978), aff'd

College,

392 A.2d 600,

413 A.2d 315 (N.J.

1979) ("The alleged inadequacy of [a physicians] disclosure must
be established by expert medical testimony because no lay jury
can be expected to reach a conclusion on such a technical matter
unaided by such testimony.

For example, it may well be that

medical practice regards the risk material to the case as being
so statistically remote that, when measured by the gravity of
harm to be expected from lack of such treatment, disclosure
thereof is normally not made."); Maguire v. Taylor,

940 F.2d 375,

377 (8th Cir. 1991) ("North Dakota law provides that ^expert
medical testimony is generally necessary to identify the risks of
treatment, their gravity, likelihood of occurrence, and
reasonable alternatives.

The necessity for expert testimony is

particularly so when such information is outside the common
knowledge of laymen.,,f); Bearfield

v. Hauch, 595 A.2d 1320, 1321

(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) ("The trier of fact must be supplied with
- 9-
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app
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defendant's specialty,

member

I*'M .sample, the Supreme wO*.

Minnesota has hp Id I h il
I n negligent nondisclosure cases the issue is whether
the physician should
have informed the patient of the
risks involved in the procedure. Thus, the admittance
of expert testimony concerning the duty of care in the
applicable medical community is necessary,
!4

Kohoutek

riginal
(

-

\ j mtr, 479 So,

s
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gislature has adopted the traditional view
- iu —

that the doctor's duty to get the informed consent of the patient
must be measured by a professional medical standard."); Fuller
Starnes,

v.

597 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Ark. 1980) (requiring "expert medical

testimony for the jury to determine whether a physician's failure
to disclose constitutes a breach of his duty to disclose"); Gurr
v. Willcutt,

707 P.2d 979, 985 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (statute

requires that "every action for medical malpractice must be
proven by" expert testimony); Sherwood v. Carter,

805 P.2d 452,

461 (Idaho 1992) (statute requires "an objective, professional
medical standard for disclosure in informed consent cases");
Guebard v. Jabaay,

452 N.E.2d. 751, 755 (111. App. Ct. 1983)

("The failure of the physician to conform to the professional
standard of disclosure must be proved by expert medical
evidence."); Charley

v. Cameron,

528 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Kan. 1974)

("Expert testimony is ordinarily necessary to establish that
[disclosures] were insufficient to accord with disclosures made
by reasonable medical practitioners under the same or like
circumstances."); Woolley

v. Henderson,

418 A.2d 1123, 1131 (Me.

1980) ("The scope of a physician's duty to disclose is measured
by those communications a reasonable medical practitioner in that
branch of medicine would make under the same or similar
circumstances and that the plaintiff must ordinarily establish
this standard by expert medical evidence."); Marchlewicz
Stanton,

v.

213 N.W.2d. 317, 320 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) ("The

question of whether a doctor is negligent in failing to inform
the patient of possible consequences of an operation is to be
- 11 -
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unknown to lay persons.

Similarly, people who do not perform

Caldwell-Luc procedures are unfamiliar with the standard of care
otolaryngologists follow when determining which risks are
material and therefore warrant disclosure.

Consequently, a

finder of fact deciding this case in the absence of expert
testimony would have no basis for a verdict other than mere
speculation and conjecture.
impermissible.

Anderson

(1943); Hoopiiaiana,

Such a groundless verdict is

v. Nixon,

supra.

104 Utah 2d 262, 139 P.2d 220

The requirement of expert testimony

is therefore appropriately applied to the case at bar.
B.

Utah Case Law Does Not Support Mr. Morgan's Assertion That
Expert Testimony is Optional in This Case.
Mr. Morgan argues that expert testimony is unnecessary in

informed consent cases.

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 11 - 14.)

His

argument, however, is not supported by the cases upon which he
relies: Ficklin
Canterbury

v.

v. MacFarlane,
Spence,

U.S. 1064 (1972).
Canterbury

550 P.2d 1295 (Utah 1976) and

464 F.2d 772 (D.C.Cir.), cert,

(Appellant's Brief, p. 12.)

denied,

409

Both Ficklin

and

acknowledge the subtle but critical distinction that

Mr. Morgan misses:

lay persons can determine whether a provider

breached a duty of disclosure only after expert testimony defines
the scope of that duty.

The Ficklin

court held that expert

testimony is optional only with respect to whether a provider
breached the duty; it did not hold that lay testimony is
sufficient to determine what risks are material and therefore
should be disclosed.

Ficklin

at 298.

Similarly, the

Canterbury

court did not require expert testimony to assist the fact
- 13 -

f i n d e r , s determinati -••-.
risk disclosure
Canterbury,

cascinaD I y , t\Kpi'scl.db ie effecl
[patient's] decision" about treatment.

s

au t**m

But Canterbury

held that "[e]xperts

are ordinarily indispensabL

e

factfinder t h e risks of therapy and t h e consequences
c

This two-part distinction from Canterbury
explained in Smith

leaving

(Id.)

treated."

v. Shannon,

was clearly

666 P.2d 351 (Wash. 1983):

The determination of materiality is d 2-step
process. Initially, the scientific nature of the risk
must be ascertained, i.e.,
the nature of the harm which
may result and the probability of its occurrence.
See,
Canterbury
v. Spence, supra at 787 - 88. [Other
citations omitted.] T h e trier of fact must then decide
whether t h e probability of that type of harm is a risk
which a reasonable patient would consider in deciding
< treatment.
While t h e second step of this determination of
materiality clearly does n o t require expert testimony,
the first step almost as clearly does .
[E]xpert
testimony is necessary t o prove t h e existence of a
risk, its likelihood of occurrence, and t h e type of
harm ' question.
Smith,

QO r.t

Canterbury

at 356

D

roperly understood, therefore,

and

produce expert testimony
risk;

establish the materiality of the

which ones are "substantial -•• - significant "

Rather, they support tl: le
Chadwick

that expert testimom

whet
significant.

m

s mandator

issue of

lsks Q f s i n u s surgery were substantia:
See, Chadwick

v

Nielsen,

(Utah A p p . 1 9 8 8 ) .

_

14

_

i it

For separate reasons, Plaintiff's burden to establish the
materiality of risk by expert testimony is not excused by the
Utah Supreme Court's holding in Nixdorf
(Utah 1980).

The dispute in Nixdorf

v. Hicken,

612 P.2d 348

concerned a physician's duty

to inform his patient that a needle had been left inside her
during surgery.

This Court in Nixdorf

found no need for expert

testimony to define the scope of a physician's duty to disclose
information material to the patient's physical condition after
surgery.

Nixdorf

at 354.

In doing so, however, the Court made

clear that M[t]he present situation differs from that found in
the informed consent context and our approach to it must reflect
this difference."

(Id.,

n.4.)

The Court therefore did not apply

the informed consent provisions of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act which require physicians to disclose only those
risks of serious harm that are "substantial and significant."
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1)(d),(e) (1987).
Court in Nixdorf

Furthermore, this

found that the underlying negligence issue did

not require expert testimony because leaving a surgical
instrument in the body was a result such that "people would know
from common knowledge and experience it is more probably than not
the result of negligence."

Id.

at 353. Nixdorf

is not analogous

to the case at bar because it concerned matters within the
knowledge and experience of lay persons, because it was not
decided under the informed consent statute, and because it dealt
with a duty to disclose information about a patient's condition
rather than the duty to disclose a risk prior to surgery.
- 15 -

'Choi oi'oro N \xdort

d u e s in.it e s t ah I i sh, Urn sLancL-u ii il or

oxporr

testimony relevant to the issues presented in I his case,
c

*

This Court Should Not Consider Mr. Morgan's Argument that
Dr. Gibbons7 Testimony Establishes a Prima Facie Case
Because That Argument is Unsupported by Citations to the
Record.
Morgan assert
prima facie

purposes of establishing

case, testimony of

Dr. Gibbons with respect iu whether the health care he rendered
carried with It a substantial and significant risi

.-

patient serious harm"

doing so,

(Appellant's Brief, p.

Morgan

;

e

ibbons' testimony without citing to

the recorc

: nr

The portion

testimony that

Morgan claims

"intended

Gibbons'
, e/ is rot even
)

This Court should not accept Mr. Morgan'

rterpretat .

f

, Gibbons' testimony because an appellate court should "only

Schettler,

record.
(Utah App. 198^

Ins.

v-t- *» :

+

Koulis

d ?-AJ, '"

Standard

; -

2d

1978)).

The propriety of summary judgment
<

768

f

affected by any

i i-

i .

Rather, the summary judgment concerned whether Mr. Morgan
established the scope oi v*.. Gibbons' duty
demonstrating that the surgery performed

disclose
u> . <l ' \u

significant risks of causing the patient serious harm."
- io -

Because

Mr. Morgan offered no expert testimony establishing that the
Caldwell-Luc procedure carried such risks, the trial court
correctly ruled that Mr. Morgan had failed as a matter of law to
establish a prima

facie

case.
POINT II.

IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT A REASONABLE, PRUDENT PERSON
IN MR. MORGAN'S CONDITION, KNOWING THE RISKS OF
TREATMENT AND NON-TREATMENT, WOULD CHOOSE SURGERY.
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act presumes informed
consent.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1) (1987).

According to the

Act, "[w]hen a person submits to health care by a health care
provider, it shall be presumed that what the health care provider
did was expressly or impliedly authorized to be done."
Ann. § 78-14-5(1) (1987).

Utah Code

In order to overcome that presumption,

a plaintiff must prove, inter

alia,

that "a reasonable, prudent

person in the patient's position would not have consented to the
health care rendered after having been fully informed as to all
facts relevant to the decision to give consent."
§ 78-14-5(1)(f) (1987).
showing.

Utah Code Ann.

Mr. Morgan has failed to make this

In fact, in neither his memorandum opposing summary

judgment nor his Appellant's Brief does Mr. Morgan even assert
that a reasonable person in his position would forego treatment.
(R. 126 - 27; Appellant's Brief, 1 7 - 2 0 . )

It is therefore not

surprising that the trial court, after reviewing the risks of
treatment and non-treatment supplied by Dr. Gibbons and noting
the complete absence of evidence to the contrary, concluded that

- 17 -

11

1

easonable person in tine plaintiff's

r

circumstances would have consented to the surgery.

(I* Hi2.)

The trial court had good reasons iur determining that a jui \
hearincr nr-.

lbbons' description of Mr. Morgan's situation -••• .and

no expert evidence to the contrary

wou] d fi nd that a
:

reasonable person :ii i i I In : If :)i:i gai :r"
Mr

Morgan's circumstances prior

follows:

Hi
i

* i :iat:ii oi i u on :i ] c:i nhoose snrqor^ rm

the operation were as

Gibbons had correctly concluded that Mr. Morgan
in

i \\\ '-Tted [.."dp i I Ionia

i n li i :•: \\ I nui'

•'

r o v e r te<l

papilloma Is a disease that spreads like a malignant tumor.
(R. 9:1 - 92 )

It can affect the bones of the si nus and the

ti ssn les of the ej e ., t h e opti c i ler v e
Surgery

- u

reatment that

from causing the loss of Mr. Morgan's

an: id 1:1: ie br a i i: :i
prevent 1nverted papilloma
- and possible brain
v; because of

the virtual assurance that bone and tissue would
Dossibilil

vi

:^

rogress into the eye and brain could
Morgan faced —

percentage chance c

destroyed,

a small

<;:; infection, additional surgery or even

minor visual disturbance
i.;*:

axes

j_n comparison.

A reasonable

ance of surgical damage with the

strong likelihood of a catastrophic course of disease would not
forsake the only treatment available.

i7

Because Mr. Morgan has conceded that summary judgment was
properly granted on the standard of care issues (Appellant's
Brief, pp. 7-8), it is undisputed that Dr. Gibbons' diagnosis was
correctly made.

Because the evidence concerning the risks of treatment and
non-treatment were compelling and undisputed, the trial court
acted within its discretion when ruling as a matter of law that a
reasonable person in Mr. Morgan7s condition would choose surgery
despite being informed of its risks.

"[W]hen the moving party

has presented evidence sufficient to support a judgment in its
favor, and the opposing party fails to submit contrary evidencef
a trial court is justified in concluding that no genuine issue of
fact is present or would be at trial." Arnica Mut. Ins.
Schettler,

768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989).

Co.

v.

Furthermore, when

reasonable minds could not differ, a trial court has the
prerogative of determining that there is no genuine issue left
Polycoat

for a jury to decide.
(Utah 1979) (quoting

Coronado

P.2d 957 (Utah 1978)).

Corp.
Mining

v. Holcomb,
Corp.

v.

591 P.2d 449

Marathon

Oil,

577

The trial court's summary judgment in

this case comports with a New York appellate decision where a
plaintiff failed to present expert testimony establishing the
materiality of risk.

See,

(N.Y. App. Div. 1985).

Hylick

The Hylick

v. Halweil,

492 N.Y.S.2d 57

court upheld a trial court's

dismissal because the absence of expert testimony on the
materiality of risks left the factfinder without any basis to
determine what a reasonable person would choose.
According to the Hylick

Id.

at 59.

court:

Assuming, arguendo, that the testimony of plaintiff and
her expert was sufficient to constitute a prima
facie
showing of qualitative insufficiency of consent,
plaintiff was still required to establish, inter
alia,
that a "reasonably prudent person in the patient's
position would not have undergone the treatment or
- 19 -

diagnosis if he had been fully informed." [Citations
omitted.] Such a determination would necessarily
require the fact-finder to balance the risks associated
with having the procedure performed, against the risks
associated with foregoing it. This record is devoid of
any evidence upon which a fact-finder could give a nonspeculative answer to that question, and the cause of
action was therefore properly dismissed. [Citations
omitted.]
j.u.

Like tr:

Morgan ha?/; I a i l e d

present any evidence which,
support

inding that

to

shown t o a f a c t f i n d e r , w o u l d

easonable p e r s o n

: .-s p o s i t i o n w o u l d
\m

rgument that a r e a s o n a b l e a n d p r u d e n t p e r s o n
woulc

s o is simp]

untenable.

T h e t r i a l court t h e r e f o r e acted

:hat a factf i i ider i: B v i ewi i lg a] ] the
e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d must conclude that a fu] 1 y informed,
r e a s o n a b l e , p r u d e n t p e r s o n i n Mr. M o r g a n ' s p o s i t i o n w o u l d h a v e
I i,ill LiH,,1 i iriver I cull pap i I lona.
After i
not differ
appei

court d e t e r m i n e s that r e a s o n a b l e m i n d s could
factual issue, then, "[o]n appea ] , it is

.

exceeded its authority,"

t I: .1 lat t h e t"rial court
Polycoat,

supra.

Mr

Morgan cannot

carry that burden because there is neither an assertion nor a
!"•• (• n i l J I l<i n i i«\ idem.'o in I he record contradicting Dr. Gibbons'
testimony that inverted papilloma is a very dangerous condition
which requires surgical intervention.

(See,

R. 9 3 93, )

Consequently, this Court should affirm the trial court's
judgment.

Rather than discussing what a reasonable person in his
circumstance would choose,

Mr. Morgan contends that the trial

court erred by not considering Mr. Morgan's subjective state of
mind.

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 17 - 18.)

Mr. Morgan asserts:

Judge Low categorically rejected the testimony of
Mr. Morgan, Ph.D., including the testimony given to
Judge Low at the conclusion of oral arguments by
Mr. Morgan, Ph.D., himself, that he would not have
proceeded with the surgery had the risks of the
complication he experienced been disclosed to him.
That testimony is discounted 100% by Judge Low in his
ruling.
Id.

Furthermore, Mr. Morgan argues that the trial court should

be reversed in order to allow a factfinder to hear evidence on
Mr. Morgan's state of mind:
Mr. Morgan, Ph.D., submits that in claims based on lack
of informed consent, that a jury trial is required to
allow the "finder of fact" to evaluate the claimant's
state of mind and whether he would have indeed
consented to surgery, at the time immediately before
the surgery when appropriate disclosures were not made.
Such a jury would need to consider Mr. Morgan, Ph.D.'s
testimony, and perhaps the testimony of other lay
witnesses, which would address Mr. Morgan, Ph.D.'s
state of mind as of the time he made the decision to
consent to the surgery . . . .
(Appellant's Brief, p. 19.)
It was not error, however, for the trial court to disregard
Mr. Morgan's state of mind.

The question before the court was

whether "a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position"
would have consented to surgery despite being fully informed of
the risks.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1)(f) (1987).

objective standard, not a subjective one.

This is an

The trial court

properly disregarded Mr. Morgan's subjective state of mind when
determining that a reasonable person in Mr. Morgan's position
- 21 -

surgery.

i
- :herefore I s not a valid ground

about Mr. M o r g a n s state

for reversal of summary judgment.
Mr, Morgan also argues that the trial court should define
the materiality

risks only after knowing the actual outcome

t h e surge?

•

a n I;' s R r i e i

establishes that the proper time
risks for the purpose c

,l

11 )

"' III!'" I m t» A » 1

judge the materiality

.nformed consent is "before health care
I nriH una1

alleged •

-av-c arisen from said health care."

§ 78- ;4-5(1)

(1987),

however,

According to Mr

mi in ii'iii i ni * s

Utah Code Ann.

Morgan:

[T]he risks claimed to have been disclosed by
Dr. Gibbons with respect to not taking any action
proved to be false, while the risk of disruption of the
bony medial wall between the ethmoid sinus and the
orbit of the eye proved to be a very real risk for
Mr. Morgan, Ph.D.
--*%

(Appellant

-

Morgan's reading of the Art
»at lent,f... ul o vc i y i i sk I hat.

occurs rather than only the "substantial and significant" risks
of serious harm that could occur.

Mr. Morgan's interpretation of

the «l|k",t' " • I mil "i iiii|ial i hi M wilh tin r h iii language <
and

-\ t

lolding in Reiser

\ »«

Lohner,

e

641 P. 2d 93 (Utah

1982), which establish a dut^ wn

^ ^o "substantial and

signi

-> surgery,

ks as viewed nri<

argument

Mr, Morgan's

herefore, does not state a grounds for reversing the

tria± c
^

. i

...

correctly held that a factfinder hearing the

undisputed testimony of Dr. Gibbons would decide that

; r_. ^

informed, reasonable person in Mr. Morgan's position prior to
surgery would choose surgical treatment.

Because this issue was

undisputed, because the substance of Dr. Gibbons' testimony is
compelling, and because the trial court applied the correct
standards, the summary judgment should be upheld.
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POINT III.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE IT IS
UNDISPUTED THAT MR. MORGAN EXECUTED A WRITTEN
CONSENT TO THE SURGERY THAT WAS PERFORMED.
Under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("the Act"), a
written consent is a complete defense to an allegation of lack of
informed consent.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(2) (1987).

The Act

provides that "it shall be a defense to any malpractice action
. . . based upon alleged failure to obtain informed consent if:
(e) the patient or his representative executed a written
consent which sets forth the nature and purpose of the
intended health care and which contains a declaration that
the patient accepts the risk of substantial and serious
harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial
results of health care and which acknowledges that health
care providers involved have explained his condition and the
proposed health care in a satisfactory manner and that all
questions asked about the health care and its attendant
risks have been answered in a manner satisfactory to the
patient or his representative; such written consent shall be
a defense to an action against a health care provider based
upon failure to obtain informed consent unless the patient
proves that the person giving the consent lacked capacity to
consent or shows by clear and convincing proof that the
execution of the written consent was induced by the
defendant's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation
or fraudulent omission to state material facts.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(2) (1987).
Mr. Morgan executed a written consent prior to undergoing
the sinus surgery.

(See, R. 97.)

In that consent, Mr. Morgan

acknowledged that he was authorizing the performance of the
surgery and that "the nature and purpose of the operation,
possible alternative methods of treatment and the possibility of
complications" had been "fully explained" to him.

(Id.)

Mr. Morgan makes no claim that he lacked the capacity to consent
to treatment or that Dr. Gibbons obtained the consent through
- 24 -

fraud or misdeed of any kind.

(R. 120 - 129; Appellate Brief,

pp. 1 - 23.)
Mr. Morgan's written consent satisfies the Act's
requirements even though it does not precisely parrot the
statutory language.

The Legislature determined, as a matter of

public policy, that a written acknowledgement of an informed
consent discussion, without a written recitation of specific
risks, is sufficient as a matter of law to establish a patient's
consent to health care.

Because Mr. Morgan executed a written

consent, his claim against Dr. Gibbons based on lack of informed
consent is without basis.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly concluded that Mr. Morgan failed
to sustain his claim that he did not give informed consent to
surgery.

Mr. Morgan did not overcome the Utah Health Care

Malpractice Act's presumption of consent because he failed to
show by expert testimony that the surgery he underwent posed a
"substantial and significant risk" of "serious harm."
Dr. Gibbons' testimony cannot now carry Mr. Morgan's burden to
establish a prima facie

case because the testimony Mr. Morgan

"intended to use" is not in the record on appeal.

Furthermore,

it is undisputed that a reasonable person in Mr. Morgan's
position would have chosen to undergo surgery despite its risks.
Finally, it is undisputed that Mr. Morgan executed a written
consent after Dr. Gibbons explained the surgery to him and
answered all of his questions.

These undisputed facts
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demonstrate that Mr. Morgan has failed as a matter of law to
establish a legal basis for recovery against Dr. Gibbons.
Therefore, Dr. Gibbons respectfully requests this Court to affirm
the trial court's summary judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

0$

day of October, 1993.

WILLIAMS & HUNT

By:
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS
ALEXNgJ. DAHL
Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellee
Gary Gibbons, M.D.
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Appendix A

341

JUDICIAL CODE

78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent —
Proof required of patient — Defenses
— Consent to health care.
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered
by a health care provider, it shall be presumed that
what the health care provider did was either expressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages from a health care provider
in an action based upon the provider's failure to obtain informed consent, the patient must prove the
following:
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed
between the patient and health care provider;
and
(b) the health care provider rendered health
care to the patient; and
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care rendered; and
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a
substantial and significant risk of causing the
patient serious harm; and
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk; and
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not have consented to the
health care rendered after having been fully informed as to all facts relevant to the decision to
give consent. In determining what a reasonable,
prudent person in the patient's position would do
under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall
use the viewpoint of the patient before health
care was provided and before the occurrence of
any personal injuries alleged to have arisen from
said health care; and
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care
rendered was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by the patient.
(2) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action
against a health care provider based upon alleged
failure to obtain informed consent if:
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the patient actually suffered was relatively minor; or
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from
the health care provider was commonly known to
the public; or
**
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the
health care complained of, that he would accept
the health care involved regardless of the risk; or
that he did not want to be informed of the matters to which he would be entitled to be informed;
or
(d) the health care provider, after considering
all of the attendant facts and circumstances, used
reasonable discretion as to the manner and extent to which risks were disclosed, if the health
care provider reasonably believed that additional
disclosures could be expected to have a substantial and adverse effect on the patient's condition;
or
(e) the patient or his representative executed a
written consent which sets forth the nature and
purpose of the intended health care and which
contains a declaration that the patient accepts
the risk of substantial and serious harm, if any,
in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of
health care and which acknowledges that health
care providers involved have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a satisfactory manner and that all questions asked about
the health care and its attendant risks have been
answered in a manner satisfactory to the patient
or his representative; such written consent shall

78-14-7.5

be a defense to an action against a health care
provider based upon failure to obtain informed
consent unless the patient proves that the person
giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or
shows by cleacand convincing proof that the execution of the written consent was induced by the
defendant's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state
material facts.
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed
to prevent any person eighteen years of age or over
from refusing to consent to health care for his own
person upon personal or religious grounds.
(4) The following persons are authorized and empowered to consent to any health care not prohibited
by law:
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor,
for his minor child;
(b) any married person, for a spouse;
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, whether formally serving or not, for the
minor under his care and any guardian for his
ward;
(d) any person eighteen years of age or over for
his or her parent who is unable by reason of age,
physical or mental condition, to provide such consent;
(e) any patient eighteen years of age or over;
(0 any female regardless of age or marital status, when given in connection with her pregnancy or childbirth;
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for his
minor brother or sister; and
(h) in the absence of a parent, any grandparent for his minor grandchild.
(5) No person who in good faith consents or authorizes health care treatment or procedures for another
as provided by this act shall be subject to civil liability.
1976
78-14-6. Writing required a s basis for liability
for breach of guarantee, warranty,
contract or assurance of r e s u l t
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care
provider on the basis of an alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be
obtained from any health care rendered unless the
guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance is set
forth in writing and signed by the health care provider or an authorized agent of the provider.
1976
78-14-7. Ad damnum clause prohibited i n complaint
No dollar amount shall be specified in the prayer of
a complaint filed in a malpractice action against a
health care provider. The complaint shall merely
pray for such damages as are reasonable in the premises.
1976
78-14-7.1. Limitation of award of noneconomic
damages in malpractice actions.
In a malpractice action against a health care provider, an injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic
losses to compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience. In no case shall the amount of damages
awarded for such noneconomic loss exceed $250,000.
This limitation does not affect awards of punitive
damages.
1986
78-14-7.5. Limitation o n attorney's contingency
fee in malpractice action.
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care
provider as defined in Section 78-14-3, an attorney

